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Abstract
This study analyzes whether multinational companies (MNC) that
are able to reduce their tax burden on capital by shifting profits to
low tax jurisdictions invest more than domestic firm. To study the
relationship, I exploit a massive corporate tax rate cut of 10%-points
in Germany 2008 as a quasi-natural experiment. This reform reduced
substantially the incentive of MNC to engage in profit shifting. Using a
difference in differences matching strategy (DiD), the results suggest
that MNC decreased their fraction of internal borrowing and their
capital stock compared to purely domestic firms. Taking the evidence
together, the findings suggest that if MNC shift profits abroad, their
capital accumulation is less depressed by the national tax rate and,
therefore, benefits less from a tax rate reduction. The DiD results are
confirmed by a more structural approach, which exploits variation in
the tax incentive to shift profits to the headquarter for identification.
Further, the results suggest that only internal debt financing but not
transfer pricing fosters capital accumulation.
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1 Introduction
A growing body of literature documents that multinational corporations use
intra-firm transactions to reduce their tax payments.1 These activities cause
a loss in tax revenue and incentivize governments to engage in tax competi-
tion by decreasing their tax rates (e.g. Devereux et al., 2008) and/or to limit
profit shifting activities by introducing anti-abuse regulations2. Thus, profit
shifting activities of multinational firms are mainly associated with welfare
losses for countries.
This might, however, not reflect the whole picture as recently pointed
out by theoretical studies (e.g. Desai et al., 2006; Hong and Smart, 2010;
Schindler and Schjelderup, 2012). A higher tax burden on capital reduces
capital accumulation (e.g. Chirinko et al., 1999). Thus, if multinational
firms are able to reduce their tax burden by shifting profits to low tax juris-
dictions, their capital accumulation should be less depressed by the national
tax rate. In other words, multinational firms that shift profits abroad should
invest more compared to domestic firms. The aim of this study is to provide
clear evidence on the positive impact of profit shifting activities on capital
accumulation.3
To answer my research question, I rely on a difference in differences design
(DiD). The causal impact of profit shifting activities on capital accumulation
is identified by comparing the financing and investment behavior of purely
domestic and multinational firms in a high tax country in response to a strong
tax rate reduction. To account for potential differences between treatment
and control group, I follow prior literature (e.g. Egger et al., 2010) and
combine the DiD with a propensity score matching approach.
Further, to link the results to the investment literature (e.g. Chirinko et
al., 1999; Bond and Xing, 2011) and to allow a comparison with the prior
literature on profit shifting activities of multinational companies, a second
identification strategy is implemented as well. This exploits the change in
the tax incentive to engage in profit shifting to the headquarter for identifica-
1e.g. Grubert and Mutti, 1991; Hines and Rise, 1994; Bartelsman and Beetsma, 2003;
Clausing 2003; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008, Huizinga et al., 2008; Weichenrieder, 2009;
Egger et al., 2010; Buettner and Wamser, 2013.
2See Fuest and Hemmelgarn (2005) and Haufler and Runkel (2012) for a theoretical
and Buettner et al. (2012), Buslei and Simmler (2013) and Blouin et al. (2014) for an
empirical analysis of thin capitalization rules. Peralta et al. (2006) investigate whether
countries should limit profit shifting or not.
3The paper deals solely with the impact of profit shifting activities on the intensive
margin of capital accumulation. For the impact of taxation on the extensive margin, i.e.
the location decision of multinational firms, see De Mooij and Ederveen (2003), Devereux
and Griffith (2003) or Barrios et al.(2013).
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tion. Compared to the first approach, the second approach is sensitive to the
modeling of the tax incentive. It allows, however, to link explicitly multi-
national firms’ tax savings to investment spending. Since the studied tax
rate reduction came along with the introduction of less generous deprecia-
tion allowances, their impact on firms’ profit shifting activities and its related
impact on capital accumulation is investigated as well. The database for both
approaches are financial statements, ownership and subsidiary information
for German firms between 2004 and 2010.
Both applied methods provide consistent results and confirm the theoret-
ical predictions. The findings suggest that multinational firms, for which the
incentive to shift profits was reduced or even abolished due to the tax rate
reduction, decreased their (internal) debt ratio and their capital stock com-
pared to domestic firms. These results are consistent with the presence of
a tax-advantage of multinational firms due to their profit shifting activities.
The tax advantage allows multinational firms to invest more compared to
domestic firms. Moreover, the analysis presents evidence that in particular
shifting profits via internal debt financing foster capital accumulation, but
not transfer pricing.
The results show further that if governments restrict the generosity of
depreciation allowances, the tax advantage of multinational firms increases
as the tax burden on capital. Thus, recent tax reforms that followed the
principle tax rate cut cum base broadening might have decreased the num-
ber of firms shifting (simply) profits (to the headquarter) but increased at
the same time the tax advantage of firms that still engage in internal debt
shifting.
The paper contributes to the prior literature in several ways. Firstly, a
new identification strategy is used. So far, most of the empirical literature
on profit shifting activities of multinational companies exploit variation in
the incentive to engage in profit shifting (e.g. Huizinga and Laeven, 2008;
Huizinga et al., 2008; Buettner and Wamser, 2013). Identification relies then
on the functional form. By using a difference in differences approach the
functional form assumption is relaxed. Moreover, by focusing on the tax rate
reduction in the high tax country, I ensure that all subsidiaries had before
the tax rate reduction an incentive to shift profits out of the high tax country.
This is important as only shifting profits out of the country affects capital
accumulation but not if profits are shifted into it. Further, the massive tax
rate reduction rules out that adjustment costs refrain firms from reacting.
By studying the tax rate reduction in the subsidiary country I further rule
out that complementarity or substitutability of production functions within
the multinational group are driving the results. This might, however, occur if
variation in the parent tax rate is used for identification as shown by Becker
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and Riedel (2012). Overesch (2009) reports that changes in the tax rate of
the parent company affect subsidiary’s investment spending. He explains
his finding by profit shifting activities. In the light of the results by Becker
and Riedel (2012) the observed impact could be fully independent of profit
shifting activities but simply be related to the interdependence of production
functions within multinational groups.
Another contribution to the literature relates to the investigation of the
potential different impact of different means of profit shifting on capital accu-
mulation. So far, prior studies did not distinguish between these two different
channels (e.g. Mintz and Smart, 2004; Overesch 2009, Egger et al., 2014).
As suggested by Schindler and Schjelderup (2013), the two different forms of
profit shifting are, however, likely to affect capital accumulation differently.
This paper is the first that accounts for the potential different impact and
provides empirical evidence on its relevance.
Moreover, I contribute to the literature by explicitly linking the profit
shifting to the investment literature. So far, both literature streams have
developed more or less separately. Since multinational firms do account for a
large share of capital accumulation, it is important to understand how these
firms react to tax policy and how the behavioral response is influenced by
the presence of profit shifting activities. The results of this paper highlight
that tax rate reductions in high tax countries may not spur investment, if
multinational firms shift profits via internal debt financing to low tax juris-
diction.
Finally, by estimating both, a difference in differences and a more struc-
tural approach, a comparison of the two methods is possible. This allows
me to gain insights into the relevance of methodological differences. Further,
using two different methods that provide consistent results adds confidence
in the empirical results.
The remainder of this paper is as follow. In section two the 2008 corporate
tax reform in Germany, the high tax country used in this study, is described.
Domestic and multinational firms’ expected behavioral responses with re-
spect to internal debt financing and capital accumulation are illustrated in
section three. After introducing the data in section four, the methodology
and the results of the difference in differences matching strategy are presented
in section five, and for the structural approach in section six. In section seven
the results of the two methods are compared. Section eight concludes.
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Figure 1: Corporate tax rates for selected parent companies of German sub-
sidiaries in 2008
Notes: Corporate income tax rates in 2008 for countries with at least 50 parent firm - year
observations in the database are shown. Tax rates are obtained from the Corporate Tax Guide
by Ernest & Young 2008.
Source: DAFNE firm data base, 2008.
2 Institutional Background: The German Cor-
porate Tax Reform 2008
The identification strategy employed in this paper compares the behavior
of multinational and domestic firms in a high tax country in response to a
large tax rate cut. The country that provides almost ideal conditions for this
identification strategy is Germany in 2008.
Firstly, prior to 2008, Germany had one of the highest tax rates on cor-
porate profits in Europe and the world. Thus, almost every foreign owned
subsidiary in Germany had an incentive to shift part of the profits abroad,
e.g. to its headquarter (see Figure 1 for a distribution of the tax rates faced
by parent companies owning German firms). Most of the subsidiaries also
seemed to follow this incentive as empirical evidence suggests that profit
shifting activities came, to a large extent, at Germany’s cost (Huizinga and
Laeven, 2008).
Secondly, to discourage firms from shifting profits abroad, the German
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government implemented with the corporate tax reform 2008 a strong reduc-
tion of the tax rate on profits from 40 to 30%.
Further changes due to the corporate tax reform concern the introduction
of less generous depreciation allowances, and the introduction of anti-abuse
regulations as the new interest barrier (see e.g. Buslei and Simmler, 2013).
A minor change that is, however, important in the light of this study relates
to the adding back regulations of the local business tax. Certain finance
expenses, e.g. interest expenses, have to be partially added back to the tax
base of the local business tax. Due to these tax base adjustment the tax rate
on profits does not necessarily equal the tax rate to which interest expenses
are deductible in Germany.4 Before 2008, only interest expenses on long term
debt (with a maturity exceeding one year) had to be added back to 50% to
the local business tax base. In order to treat interest expenses for short and
long term debt in the same way, this applies beginning in 2008 to all interest
payments but only to 25%. The share of the local business tax of the overall
tax rate is around 50%.5
3 Theoretical Background
To illustrate the impact of internal debt financing on real investment and
how both are affected by the German corporate tax reform 2008, the cost of
capital approach (e.g. Jorgenson, 1963; Hall and Jorgenson, 1967) is used
and extended by allowing for internal debt financing.6
To account for internal debt financing in the multinational context, the
starting point of the approach is a shareholder who owns two representative
firms in two different countries (G and A). The shareholders’ interest is to
4The origin of these regulations go back to the 1990s, when the local business taxes,
set and collected by German municipalities, were designed to be a tax on infrastructure
use.
5Before 2008, the local business tax rate was calculated as local business tax multi-
plier, set by the municipality, times the Gewerbesteuermesszahl, which was 5.5% for all
municipalities. Further, the local business tax was deductible from its own and from the
corporate income tax base. The effective local business tax amounts before the reform to
roughly 18% for the average multiplier of 400. Since local business tax payments reduce
the corporate income tax base, the average overall tax rate amounts to 39% (18%+(1-
18%)*26.38%). Due to the corporate tax reform, the Gewerbesteuermesszahl was reduced
to 3.5% and the deductibility of the local business tax abolished. The average overall
tax rate on profits amounts thus after 2007 to 29% (14% local business tax and 15.8%
corporate income tax, including solidarity surcharge). The difference between the tax rate
on profits and to which interest payments are deductible decreased. On average, before
the reform it amounted to 6%; after to 3.5%.
6For an overview and extensions of the approach see Devereux (2004).
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maximize the value of the two firms (VG,t and VA,t). The value of a firm can
be expressed as the present value of its future cash flows (equation (1)), which
is the sum of real activity cash flow (pir) and financial activity cash flow (pif )
(equation (2)). The real activity cash flow in period s for each firm equals
sales (price ps multiplied with output F (Ks−1)) minus investment costs and
taxes. Firms’ tax payments are determined by the tax rate on profits (u)
and depreciation allowances (φ) (see equation (3) for the firm in country G).
The financial activity cash flow captures internal debt financing and, thus,
borrowing and lending between the two firms of the shareholder. It is deter-
mined by three terms and exemplary shown for the firm in country G.7 The
first term in equation (4) reflects that interest payments for internal debt
financing, given by the share βG,t−1 of the capital stock (KG,t−1) in coun-
try G, can be deducted from the tax base.8 The tax rate to which interest
payments are deductible (uG,mod,t) may however differ from the tax rate on
profits (uG,t) due to, for instance, adding back regulations or thin capital-
ization rules. Since internal debt financing cannot exceed the amount of the
capital stock, it is important to note that β is bounded as it cannot exceed
one.9 The second term determining firms’ financial cash flow is the impact
of internal debt financing of the capital stock in A on profits in G, thus the
opposite case. In this case, the tax base in country G is broadened by the
received interest income.
Vt = VG,t + VA,t (1)
Vt,G = Et
∑
s=t
(1 + r)−s[pir,s,G + pif,s,G] (2)
pir,t,G = (1− uG,t)pG,tF (KG,t−1)− qtIG,t + usφ(qtIG,t +KTG,t−1)(3)
pif,t,G = −(1− uG,mod,t)rβG,t−1KG,t−1 + (1− uG,t)rβA,t−1KA,t−1
+c(βG,t−1) (4)
c(βG,t−1) = cfix + cvar(βG,t−1) = cGpi∗G,t(uG,mod,t − uA,t) + cvar(βG,t−1)(5
Kt = It + (1− δ)Kt−1 (6)
KTt = (1− φ)KTt−1 + (1− φ)qt−1It (7)
If firms use internal debt financing, they face costs (c(β)) that consist of
7In the following I ignore that cash flow changes due to the received respectively paid
back, nominal value of debt and focus only on interest payments.
8In principle, multinational firms might manipulate interest rates as well. However,
this strategy would conflict with the arm’s-length principle and is thus not considered in
this study.
9In principle β might exceed one but in this case capital would earn only the interest
rate. Thus, it would be beneficial to receive this income in the low tax country.
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a fixed (cfix) and variable part (cvar(β)) (equation (5)). The fixed cost com-
ponent is assumed to be a fraction (cG) of firms’ maximal tax savings based
on firms’ maximal taxable profits (pi∗G,t(uG,mod − uA)).10 It accounts for the
fact that multinational firms have different ways to shift profits abroad, e.g.
internal debt financing and transfer pricing. Thus, they use the way that
allows them to shift more (which is the way with lower overall costs). The
main advantage of using a fixed cost component for internal debt financing
is that transfer pricing and its related costs does not have to be explicitly
modeled but are still included in the model. There are various ways to model
transfer pricing as this depends on the input factors (e.g. royalties or man-
agement services) of which prices are manipulated. The variable cost part
of internal debt financing is assumed to be convex in the fraction of internal
debt financing as standard in the literature.11 It relates to tax engineering
expenses incurred in order to avoid or relax regulations such as thin capital-
ization rules and/or controlled-foreign-company rules.12
The shareholder maximizes the present value of the future cash flows by
choosing the state variables for the two firms, firms’ capital stock and the
fraction of internal borrowing (K and β). The maximization is subject to
a capital accumulation constraint (equation (7)) and the valuation of the
capital stock for tax purposes (equation (8)).
Optimal Internal Debt Financing: Out of the model, three insights
regarding the optimal fraction of internal debt financing (β∗G) in country
G can be derived (equations (8) and (9)). One insight relates to the first
order condition for the interior solution, the two other deal with the corner
solutions.
One of the two corner solutions is that the firm can shift as much as it
wants and thus faces ultimately a zero tax burden in the high tax country
G (third line equation (9)). The maximum fraction that has to be shifted
is given by equation (8) as for βmaxG,t−1 taxable profits in country G are zero
10In principle the maximal tax savings could relate to actual production, but this would
not change the results qualitatively.
11Further, prior literature assumes that the cost of shifting increases in the capital stock
(e.g. Schindler and Schjelderup, 2012). The results are not sensitive to this choice. The
only difference is that the impact of internal debt financing on capital accumulation would
in this case be reduced by the costs of shifting. Since I am not able to account for the
cost of internal debt financing in the empirical analysis, I have to leave the question for
future research and assume the simpler case in my model. The impact I estimate is the
net effect.
12It is assumed that the costs of internal debt financing are not tax-deductible. The
assumption is not crucial for the results. If the costs are deductible, then the firm has an
incentive to deduct them in the high tax country.
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in period t.13 This maximum fraction increases with the ratio of profits
before interest payments to the capital stock (first term within the brackets)
and decreases with the share of depreciation allowances to the capital stock
(second term within the brackets). Since β cannot exceed one, this means
that firms with a high ratio of profits before interest to their capital stock
and/or low depreciation allowances are not able to reduce their tax payments
to a large extent by using internal debt financing. Finally, the maximum
share increases with the ratio between the tax rate on profits and the tax
rate to which interest payments are deductible.
The other corner solution (first line, equation (9)) and thus the second in-
sight relates to the question whether a firm engages in internal debt financing
or not. This depends on the fixed costs. If tax savings exceed the costs, the
firm engages in internal debt financing. Since the fixed costs are a fraction of
firms’ potential overall tax savings, a firm will only engage in internal debt
financing if it can substantially reduce its tax payment. Thus, drawing from
the insights before, firms with a high ratio of profits to the capital stock are
less likely to engage in internal debt financing as these firms are not able to
reduce their tax burden to a large extent.
Finally, the last insight relates to the question how much internal financ-
ing is used if the firm engages in debt financing and cannot shift as much
as it want. It is given by the first order condition for the interior solution
(second line, equation (9)) and states that for the optimal amount of internal
debt financing the marginal benefit of internal debt financing, expressed by
the tax savings, equals the marginal costs, a common result in the literature
(e.g. Schindler and Schjelderup, 2012).
βmaxG,t−1 =
uG,t
uG,mod,t
piTr,t,G
rKG,t−1
(8)
=
uG,t
uG,mod,t
[
pG,tF (.)
rKG,t−1
− φ(qG,tIG,t +K
T
G,t−1)
rKG,t−1
]
βoptG,t−1 =

0 if a ≤ pi
∗
G,tcG
rKG,t−1
KG,t−1r(uG,mod,t − uA,t) = cβG,t−1(β∗G,t−1) if a >
pi∗G,tcG
rKG,t−1
and β∗G,t−1 ≤ βmaxG,t−1
min(1, βmaxG,t−1) if β
∗
G,t−1 > β
max
G,t−1
13One has to derive an expression for firms tax payments in period t, set it to zero and
solve it for β.
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with
a =
β∗G,t−1rKG,t−1 −
cvar(β∗G,t−1)
uG,mod,t−uA,t
rKG,t−1
(9)
Optimal capital stock with debt shifting: The first order condition
for the optimal capital stock of the representative firms in county G is given
by equation (10).14 In the optimum the marginal productivity of capital (left
hand side) has to equal marginal costs (right hand side). The latter consist
for multinational firms of two parts. The first term is the usual expression
for the user costs of capital using retained earnings (e.g. Chirinko et al.,
1999). It depends on the present value of depreciation allowances (1−A)15,
the finance costs r, the economic depreciation rate δ, and the business tax
rate ut. The second term captures the impact of internal debt financing. It
is obvious that if the capital stock of the representative firm in country G is
(partly) financed with internal debt (βG > 0), the user costs of capital are
lower than without shifting (equation (11)). Further, since only βG,t affects
the return of capital in country G, there will be no difference in the user costs
of capital in country G, if profits are shifted from A to G.
FKG,t =
(1− AG,t+1)(r + δ))− rβG,t(uG,mod,t+1 − uA,t+1)
pG,t+1(1− uG,t+1) (10)
= UCCREG,t −
rβG,t(uG,mod,t+1 − uA,t+1)
pG,t+1(1− uG,t+1) (11)
A =
utφ(1 + r)
φ+ r
(12)
Before summing up the hypothesis derived from the neoclassical invest-
ment model, two simplifying assumption are discussed. The first concerns
the fact that only two companies are considered in the analysis, the second
the role of external debt financing.
More than two countries: To understand the incentive in a more
general setting, the case with three firms is briefly described. The shareholder
owns in the following a firm in T as well. Profits from G can now be shifted
to A and T. The costs of shifting depend on the overall fraction that is shifted
abroad (βG,A,t+βG,T,t). Further, one may assume that the shareholder prefers
14The expression is derived by taking the first order condition for the optimal capital
stock, then setting inflation and expected real change in the price of capital to zero.
15Present value of depreciation allowances is shown for declining-balance method.
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(or dislikes) profits to be located in country A (ω). The first order condition
for the interior solution for the optimal fraction of internal debt financing are
shown in equation (13) and (14).
cβG,A,t = KG,tr(uG,mod,t+1 − uA,t+1) + ωβG,A,t(βG,A,t) (13)
cβG,T,t = KG,tr(uG,mod,t+1 − uT,t+1) (14)
FKG,t = UCC
RE
G,t −
rβG,A,t(uG,mod,t+1 − uA,t+1)
pG,t+1(1− uG,t+1) (15)
= −rβG,T,t(uG,mod,t+1 − uT,t+1)
pG,t+1(1− uG,t+1)
Depending on the preference parameter (ω) and the tax rates in the two
countries, two different cases may arise out of this setting. Firstly, the share-
holder shifts all profits to one location, which is then not different from the
two country case. Secondly, it may be optimal to shift part of the profits
to one place and the rest to the other place. The capital stock in G for the
latter case is given by equation (15). It depends now on the tax rates in
all three countries, but the implications are the same as in the two country
case. If multinational firms shift profits abroad via internal debt financing,
they face lower investment costs and thus have a higher capital stock than
domestic firms.
External Debt Financing: Compared to retained earnings, internal
and external debt financing is tax favored as interest payments are de-
ductible from the tax base. In contrast to internal debt financing, how-
ever, both, domestic and multinational firms, are able to use external debt
financing. Following the trade-off-theory, the use of external debt financing
causes bankruptcy costs (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973). If in the optimum,
bankruptcy costs equal the tax advantage of external debt on the firm level,
both type of firms would - if otherwise identical - use the same amount of
external debt and thus react to the same extend to a change in the tax advan-
tage. Further, their investment would be equally affected. The implications
stated above would thus be the same.
If marginal costs and benefits are not balanced on the firm but rather
on the group level, the picture would change. In this case, external and
internal debt are to some extend substitutes as multinational firms have an
incentive to load firms in high tax countries with a larger amount of debt
(see Moen et al., 2011). Multinational firms will then react differently with
their external debt ratio to changes in the tax rate. Although this is likely
to affect the estimates for the overall debt ratio, I do not expect a bias in
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the investment equation. External debt financing does not seem to influence
capital accumulation as at the margin marginal costs and marginal benefits
of external debt financing equal each other (e.g. Bond and Xing, 2011).
Summing up, the following hypothesis can be derived out of the model.
Hypothesis 1a: If the tax rate on profits in country A is lower than the tax
rate to which interest expenses are deductible in country G, then the share-
holder of the firms in G and A shift profits from G to A. The larger the
difference is, the higher the share of internal debt financing.
Hypothesis 1b: Firms with a high ratio of profits before interest to their
capital stock do not engage in internal debt financing due to fixed costs. Fur-
ther, internal borrowing of firms with generous depreciation allowances de-
pends less on the tax rate difference as these firms are able to shift as much
income as they want and are, therefore, not constrained by marginal costs.
For the 2008 corporate tax rate cut, this means that multinational firms
will decrease their internal debt financing as the tax advantage to engage in
internal debt financing is reduced. Further, I expect due to fixed costs of
internal debt financing that firms with a low ratio of profits to their capital
stock will decrease their internal debt financing stronger than firms with a
high ratio of profits. Since firms benefiting from more generous depreciation
allowances have to shift less, their fraction of internal borrowing was lower
before the tax rate reduction. Thus, their reduction in the internal debt ratio
in response to the tax rate cut should be less strong.
Hypothesis 2a: If profits are shifted from country G to A, the capital stock
in G is larger than without internal debt financing shifting.
Hypothesis 2b: The relative advantage of the profit shifting firm with re-
spect to investment increases in the ratio between profits shifted abroad and
the overall taxable profits. Thus, the positive impact on investment is larger
for firms with a low ratio of profits before interest payments to the capital
stock and for firms with less generous depreciation allowances.
If multinational firms shifted profits via internal debt financing to low
tax jurisdictions prior to the tax rate reduction, their investment was less
affected by the national tax rate. In other words, their capital stock will
benefit less from the tax rate reduction, and should, thus, decreases relative
to purely domestic firms. Further, I expect that the reduction in the capital
stock is larger for firms that were more actively engaged in internal debt
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shifting before the reform. These are firms with a low share of profits to the
capital stock and firms with less generous depreciation allowances.
4 Data
To test the hypothesis outlined in the previous section, two different methods
are used. The first method is a difference in differences propensity score
estimation; the second a more structural approach. Since for both methods
the same dataset is used, although using different subsample, I start by
describing the data and then introduce in the next two sections the methods
in detail and present the results.
The database of this study are unconsolidated financial statements, own-
ership and subsidiary information for German incorporated firms between
2004 and 2010 from the database DAFNE. This data has two main advan-
tages compared to other data sets used to study the behavior of multinational
firms. Firstly, beginning in 2006 it covers almost 85% of all German firms
with limited liability. Thus, the database allows to compare multinational
firms with a broad set of domestic firms instead of exploiting differences be-
tween multinational firms. Secondly, at least for a subsample of firms income
statements are observed. This allows on the one side to explore firm hetero-
geneity as suggested by the theoretical model. On the other side it allows to
complement the main analysis, which uses only balance sheet information,
with additional regression results using interest payments and profits.
Two main selections are made to derive the final samples. Firstly, I re-
quire that all firms in the sample are owned by another non-natural person.
The main reason is to exclude stand-alone companies from the control group
such that only firms belonging to a domestic group are compared with firms
belonging to a multinational group. Secondly, I require that the firms in-
cluded in the final sample are observed before and after the reform as the
identification is based on the changed incentive due to the specific reform.
A minor selection concerns the exclusion of subsidiaries owned by parent
companies located in countries that apply the worldwide principle for corpo-
rate taxation (in my sample US, UK, and Japan). Their investment decision
depends independently of internal debt financing on the parent tax rate.
Further, firms with changes in the ownership structure are excluded as these
could be driven by taxes as well.
The data is complemented by a collection of foreign tax rates to capture
the tax incentive to engage in internal debt financing to the headquarter.16
Further, to exploit variation in the tax rate on profits in Germany, which
16The data stems from the Ernst & Young tax guides.
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varies across the 12,000 municipalities, municipality specific local business
tax rates are merged to the data using firms’ postal code.17
5 Difference-in-Differences Propensity Score
Estimation
5.1 Methodology & Descriptive Statistics
The first approach used to provide evidence on the causal impact of internal
debt financing on capital accumulation compares the financing and invest-
ment behavior of purely domestic to multinational firms, before and after the
reform. Thus, I estimate a difference in differences specification of the form
given in equation (16). The main advantage of this approach is that I do not
have to model the tax incentive to engage in internal debt shifting, which is
almost impossible given the complex structures of multinational companies
and the missing information on finance flows.
Yi,t = αi+β0Treatmenti+β1Treatmenti∗Reform+β2Reform+ei,t (16)
Descriptivie statistics, reported in Table 1, suggest that multinational
and domestic firms are different with respect to their observable characteris-
tics. Domestic firms are smaller, have a lower debt ratio and a higher capital
stock than multinational firms. Further, they operate in different indus-
tries. To account for these difference, I combine the difference in differences
with a propensity score matching approach. This approach stems from the
evaluation literature and can be used to make treatment and control group
more comparable (Heckman et al., 1997).18 It is used in a similar context
by Egger et al. (2010). The idea of the approach is to use only treated and
control companies that are sufficiently similar to each other for the compar-
ison. Treatment and control group observations are thus matched on a set
of variables X such that the conditional mean independence assumption is
fulfilled. The assumption states that both group would behave similar in the
absence of the treatment.
Crucial assumption for the matching approach is the inclusion of all rel-
evant characteristics X in the analysis. The broadest set of variables, on
which I match the two groups are: industry classification, debt ratio 2005,
17The local business tax rates are provided by the Federal Statistical Office. Since I
have firm level data and not plant level data, I cannot account for the fact that plants of
the same firm located in different municipality may face different local business tax rates.
18Stuart (2010), Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) and Caliendo and Kuenn (2011) provide
comprehensive overviews and an application of matching methods.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for treatment and control group up to 2006
Mean p-value
Control Treatment t-test
Group Group (two-sided)
firm size (log(total assets)) 8.29 8.87 0.00
debt ratio 0.45 0.50 0.00
log(capital stock in thd. EURO) 6.14 5.54 0.00
d.debt ratio -0.01 -0.01 0.57
d.log(capital stock) 0.05 0.02 0.21
Industry dummies
agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.01 0.00 0.00
mining and quarrying 0.00 0.00 0.56
manufacturing 0.05 0.25 0.00
electricity and gas supply 0.11 0.03 0.00
water supply 0.02 0.03 0.00
construction 0.04 0.23 0.00
wholesale and retail trade 0.01 0.00 0.00
transportation and storage 0.07 0.07 0.81
information and communication 0.01 0.02 0.34
accommodation and food service activities 0.42 0.33 0.00
real estate activities 0.05 0.00 0.00
professional, scientific and technical activities 0.09 0.01 0.00
administrative and support service activities 0.11 0.03 0.00
Notes: Control group consists of purely domestic firms, that are observed between 2005 and
2009. Treatment group includes firms that had before the reform an incentive to engage in
debt financing to the headquarter, which was abolished due to the reform.
Source: DAFNE firm data base 2004 - 2006.
firm size 2005 (measured as natural logarithm of total assets), and (natural
logarithm of the) capital stock in 2005 as well as the change in the capital
stock and the debt ratio between 2005 and 2006.19 I use the 2005 and 2006
characteristics as the reform was announced in 2007. Although one might
argue that matching on capital stock and finance structure does not increase
the similarity of treatment and control group since multinational firms that
shift profits have a higher debt ratio and invest more, the null hypothesis
is that both firms behave in the same way. To check the sensitivity of the
results, I exclude these variables in a robustness check.
Since I match on multiple variables, proximity between observations is
based on the estimated one-dimensional propensity score, which is the prob-
ability of receiving treatment, conditional on the matching variables X. It
is estimated by running a logistic regression of the treatment indicator on
X.20 As distance measure, I use the linear propensity score, which improves
the balance between treatment and control groups (Rosenbaum and Rubin,
1985). Finally, the observations are matched using kernel and, in a sensitivity
19In a robustness specification, I also matched on changes between 2004 and 2005. The
results are qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged and are available upon request.
20Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) show that conditioning on X is equivalent to condition-
ing on the propensity score.
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check, 5-to-1 nearest neighbor matching, both with replacement. To evaluate
the matching quality I report standardized bias before and after matching.21
Since the combination of DiD and propensity score estimation requires a bal-
anced sample as otherwise the estimation would suffer from sample attrition,
I include only firms in the sample that are observed in every year between
2005 and 2009.
The control group in my setting consists of 6,083 purely domestic firms.
These are firms that are ultimately owned by another German corporation,
and that do not own foreign subsidiaries, neither directly nor indirectly (via
the parent company or subsidiaries). The treatment group in contrast consist
of 1,081 foreign owned firms. These multinational firms had before the reform
an incentive to engage in internal debt financing to the headquarter that was
abolished by the reform. The parent companies of these subsidiaries are, for
example, located in France or Sweden (see Table A.1 in the Appendix). I
focus on this particular group of multinational firms as, firstly, only 30% of
the multinational firms have a subsidiary in a tax haven (Gumpert et al.,
2011; Buettner et al., 2013). Moreover, there seems to be a home bias in
multinational firms’ profit shifting activities (Dischinger et al., 2014). Thus,
shifting profits to the parent company is likely to be a very important channel.
Secondly, if a multinational subsidiary had before and after the reform an
incentive to engage in internal debt shifting, its’ reaction is likely to be less
strong, which may attenuate the estimated treatment effects. The sensitivity
of the exclusion of other multinational firms is assessed in a robustness check.
The two outcome variables of interest are (the natural logarithm of) firms’
capital stock and firms’ debt ratio (defined as total liabilities to total assets,
inluding internal liabilities). The latter is used since internal liabilities are
not observed for all firms in the sample. Following the theoretical predic-
tions, firm heterogeneity is assessed by splitting the sample according to
firms’ ratio of profits before interest payments to total assets and reapply
the propensity score matching approach. Since profits are not observed for
each company in the data, two-digit industry averages based on all available
firms in the database are used. The mean ratio of profits before interest
to total assets is around 30%. To uncover the impact of the generosity of
depreciation allowances on internal debt financing and firms’ capital accu-
mulation, I interact the ratio of depreciation allowances to total assets with
the Treatment*After variable. As for profits, two-digit industry averages are
used, the mean is around 5.4%.
21The standardized bias is calculated as the difference between the mean characteristic
of the treated and matched control firms, standardized by the square root of the average
of the variances in the two groups.
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5.2 Results
Before presenting the results based on the matched sample, information on
the propensity score estimation is provided. The results from the logistic
regression used to estimate the propensity score reflect the differences be-
tween foreign owned firms and purely domestic firms (Table A.2 in the Ap-
pendix). After estimating the propensity score, I apply kernel matching to
identify suitable control observations for every firm in the treatment group.
The standardized bias indicates a successful matching as for all variables, I
match on, the bias is below 5% (Table A.3 in the Appendix).
I begin with providing graphical evidence on the studied relationship. The
evolution of the debt ratio for treatment and control group using the matched
sample are shown on the left hand side of Figure 2. The debt ratio is nor-
malized by groups’ mean debt ratio in 2006. The common trend assumption
seems to be fulfilled as between 2005 and 2006 both groups exhibit a similar
trend. In line with the theoretical expectations, both the treatment (Shifter-
NonShifter) and control (purely domestic firms) group decreased their debt
ratios after 2007 since the tax rate reduction reduced the tax advantage of
debt (e.g. Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Feld et al., 2013). Further, in line
with the derived hypothesis in section 3, the debt ratio of the treatment
group decreased stronger.
The evolution of the capital stock for both type of firms is shown on
the right hand side of Figure 2. Depicted is the natural logarithm of the
capital stock, normalized by the groups’ mean in 2006. Purely domestic
firms increased their capital stock after 2007, which is consistent with the
literature on taxes and investment spending (e.g. Chirinko et al., 1999).
Firms for which the tax incentive to engage in internal debt financing was
abolished (Shifter-NonShifter) did not increase their capital stock.
The clear picture of the graphical analysis is confirmed by the results of
the difference in differences regression analysis, which accounts for firm spe-
cific effects. Column (1) and (2) of Table 2 show the results for the debt ratio
and the natural logarithm of the capital stock as dependent variable based on
the sample using kernel, and (3) and (4) using 5-to-1 nearest neighbor match-
ing. In all specification, there is a statistically significant, negative impact
for the treatment group due to the corporate income tax rate reduction in
2008. The results suggest that on average the treatment group reduced their
debt ratio by 2.2 (kernel matching) to 2.3%-points (5-to-1 nearest neighbor)
compared to domestic firms. This is in line with the hypothesis that these
firms reduced or even stopped using internal debt financing to lower their
taxable income. With regard to the capital stock, the results show that firms
which stopped shifting profits abroad via internal debt financing decreased
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Figure 2: Evolution debt ratio and capital stock for purely domestic firms
and Shifter-NonShifter based on the matched sample
Notes: The debt ratio is defined as total liabilities to total assets. Groups and sample as described in the text.
Source: DAFNE firm data base, 2005 - 2009.
their capital stock by around 7 (5-to-1 nearest neighbor) to 11%-points (ker-
nel matching) compared to domestic firms. All presented results are so far
in line with the theoretical hypothesis 1a and 2a outlined in Section 3.
Table 2: Results difference in differences (DiD) specification
Matching Method Kernel Nearest Neighbor Kernel
Matching Variables with debt variables without
debt variables
change capital stock
Dep. Var Debt Capital Debt Capital Debt Capital
Ratio Stock Ratio Stock Ratio Stock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D(> 2007) -0.016*** 0.120*** -0.019*** 0.124*** -0.020*** 0.080***
(0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.008) (0.001) (0.011)
D(TR)*D(> 2007) -0.022*** -0.107** -0.023*** -0.070* -0.023*** -0.125***
(0.005) (0.040) (0.005) (0.040) (0.005) (0.043)
Observations 35,615 35,615 17,025 17,025 35,615 35,615
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Each regression includes a full set of firm and
time dummies (not reported). Stars *, **, *** indicate significant at the 10/5/1% level.
Source: DAFNE firm database, 2005 to 2009, own calculations.
Before turning to the heterogeneity analysis, the sensitivity of the results
is assessed. I start with excluding the finance structure variables as well as
the growth rate for the capital stock from the matching variables. The main
argument is that due to the fact that multinational firms use internal debt
financing and thus have a higher debt ratio than domestic firms, matching
treatment and control group on their finance structure does not increase their
similarity but rather their dissimilarity. The results are reported in Table 2,
column (5) and (6). The result for the debt ratio is almost unchanged, while
the impact for the capital stock increases to 12.5%. Overall, however, the
results are not statistically different from the baseline specification.
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The second sensitivity check concerns the focus on firms that had before
the reform an incentive to shift profits to the headquarter, but not after.
Table 3 reports the results where all multinational firms, respectively only
Shifter-Shifter (firms with an incentive before and after the reform to engage
in debt financing to the headquarter) and NonShifter-NonShifter (firms that
had neither before nor after the reform an incentive to engage in debt financ-
ing to the headquarter) form the treatment group. Neither for Shifter-Shifter
nor for NonShifter-NonShifter are significant results found. When using all
multinationals as treated firms, only the negative impact on investment is
significant. These results suggest that it seems to be, in particular, Shifter-
NonShifter that drive the results, as only these firms had to adjust their debt
financing due to the changed tax incentive.
Table 3: Sensitivity analysis: DiD specification
Matching Method Kernel
Treatment Group All multinational Shifter- NonShifter-
(TR) firms Shifter NonShifter
Dep. Var Debt Capital Debt Capital Debt Capital
Ratio Stock Ratio Stock Ratio Stock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D(> 2007) -0.009*** 0.102*** -0.015*** 0.092*** -0.025*** 0.050
(0.002) (0.015) (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.054)
D(TR) * D(> 2007) -0.009 -0.099*** 0.002 -0.060 0.003 -0.117
(0.006) (0.030) (0.011) (0.045) (0.006) (0.100)
Observations 40,455 40,455 33,900 33,900 27,270 27,270
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Each regression includes a full set of firm and
time dummies (not reported). Stars *, **, *** indicate significant at the 10/5/1% level.
Source: DAFNE firm database, 2005 to 2009, own calculations.
Heterogeneity Analysis: The results for firm heterogeneity with firms’
debt ratio as dependent variable are presented in Table 4. There is only
weak evidence that firms with a low ratio of profits to total assets (Table
4, column (1)) decreased their debt ratio more compared to firms with a
high ratio (Table 4, column (3)). Further, the difference is not statistically
significant. The main reason is probably that the external debt ratio does
change differently for multinational firms, making thus the impact of the
overall debt ratio as measured in Table 4 ambiguous. With respect to the
role of depreciation allowance, the results are also not fully convincing as the
interaction terms are not significant. However, for the group that is likely to
engage in internal debt financing the main effect increases in absolute terms
and the interaction term is positive, which is in line with a lower reduction
in firms’ debt ratio the more generous the depreciation allowances are.
The results for the capital stock as dependent variable are in line with
the theoretical expectation. They show that firms, which are not active in
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Table 4: Heterogeneity debt ratio DiD specification
Dependent variable: Change in liabilities to shareholders
Sample
pF (.)−wL
K
< Mean
pF (.)−wL
K
> Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D(> 2007) -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.017*** -0.030***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
D(TR) * D(year > 2007) -0.024** -0.068 -0.022*** 0.010
(0.009) (0.063) (0.006) (0.024)
D(> 2007) * Depr.A
K
0.072*** 0.280***
(0.008) (0.000)
D(TR) * D(> 2007) * Depr.A
K
1.319 -0.664
(1.601) (0.400)
Observations 16,693 16,693 16,917 16,917
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Each regression includes a full set of
time dummies (not reported). Stars *, **, *** indicate significant at the 10/5/1%
level.
Source: DAFNE firm database, 2005 to 2009, own calculations.
internal debt financing (Table 5, column (3)) due to fixed costs, decrease
their capital stock less than firms with a low ratio of profits to total assets
(Table 5, column (1)) compared to domestic firms. Further, firms likely to
engage in internal debt financing that benefit from generous depreciation
allowances, experienced a lower reduction in the capital stock. This suggest
that internal debt financing fosters their capital accumulation less due to a
lower tax burden on capital. In contrast are the results for firms that are
less likely to engage in internal debt financing. For these firms depreciation
allowances affect capital accumulation only by changing the investment costs.
Nevertheless, also for these firms profit shifting activities seem to impact
capital accumulation, although to a much smaller extent.
Overall the results are similar to Egger et al. (2014), who find that around
11% of all multinational firms (which are, in particular, the large ones) in
their sample are tax avoiders and thus their investment is unaffected by
changes in the tax rate. The main difference, however, is that my results
suggest that firms that engage in internal debt shifting (which are firms with
a low ratio of profits to assets) are, in particular, unaffected by tax rate
changes. Thus, if multinational firms use either transfer pricing or internal
debt financing to reduce their tax burden, the results suggest that both means
of profit shifting have a different impact on capital accumulation.
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Table 5: Heterogeneity capital stock DiD specification
Dependent variable: Growth rate of the capital stock
Sample
pF (.)−wL
K
< Mean
pF (.)−wL
K
> Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D(> 2007) 0.114*** 0.080*** 0.141*** 0.136***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013)
D(TR) * D(year > 2007) -0.189** -0.776*** -0.094** -0.114**
(0.086) (0.235) (0.043) (0.041)
D(> 2007) * Depr.A
K
1.019*** 0.101***
(0.076) (0.001)
D(TR) * D(> 2007) * Depr.A
K
16.969*** 0.412
(5.584) (0.669)
Observations 16,693 16,693 16,917 16,917
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Each regression includes a full
set of time dummies (not reported). Stars *, **, *** indicate significant at the
10/5/1% level.
Source: DAFNE firm database, 2005 to 2009, own calculations.
6 Second Approach: Structural Approach
6.1 Methodology & Descriptive Statistics
To allow to link the results to the investment literature and as an addi-
tional test of the hypothesis a second, more structural approach is applied.
Compared to the first approach, it has the advantage that the estimated co-
efficients are related to the potential tax savings of shifting profits abroad.
The costs are that the tax incentive of multinational firms must be explicitly
modeled.
Since multinational groups are complex and the construction of the rel-
evant tax incentive, therefore, almost impossible, I restrict the analysis to
a particular channel, which is the incentive to shift profits to the headquar-
ter. Three arguments support the relevance of this channel for multinational
firms’ profit shifting activities. Firstly, the results of the difference in differ-
ences approach are, only significant for multinational subsidiaries that had
an incentive to engage in internal debt shifting to the headquarter before
the reform, but not after. Secondly, there seems to be a home bias in inter-
nal debt financing (Dischinger et al., 2014). Thirdly, only up to 30% of all
multinational firms have subsidiaries in tax havens (Gumpert et al., 2011;
Buettner et al., 2013). A further advantage is that liabilities to the par-
ent company are directly observed in the data in contrast to liabilities to
other subsidiaries. The latter are only available as the sum of all liabilities
to other subsidiaries. Moreover, since the reform abolished the incentive to
shift profits to the headquarter completely for some firms, a potential omitted
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variables bias is of minor importance.22
To test the hypothesis outlined in Section 3, I estimate two equations.
The first refers to the optimal amount of internal debt financing to the par-
ent company (equation (17)). Thus, the dependent variable is the share of
liabilities against the parent company to total assets (
LSi,t
TAi,t
). The explana-
tory variable of interest is the tax rate differential (TRD). It captures the
incentive to engage in profit shifting via internal debt financing. It is calcu-
lated as the difference between the tax rate to which interest payments are
deductible, and the tax rate on profits of the parent company. Since the TRD
is negative for some firms after the 2008 corporate tax reform, it should not
affect the internal debt ratio which includes no receivables from the parent
company. To account for the irrelevance of the TRD in this case, I interact
the TRD with a dummy that is one if a company has no tax incentive to
shift profits to the headquarter (D(NITS)). The coefficient of the TRD ( α1)
should be positive since a positive TRD allows firms to save taxes by using
internal debt financing. The TRD should, however, not influence the opti-
mal amount of internal liabilities if a company has no tax incentive to shift
profits. Thus, the sum of α1 and α2 should be zero.
Besides the TRD and the interaction term I control in the regression for
the business tax rate in Germany, as well as for firm size (measured as the
natural logarithm of total assets) and the business cycle (by including time
dummies). The business tax rate in Germany is identified due to the variation
in the local business tax rate. All control variables are captured in the matrix
Xi,t. Since the fraction of internal borrowing may depend on a firm specific
effect (η1,i), estimation is done in first differences. Robust standard errors,
clustered for the location of the parent company, are reported.
LSi,t
TAi,t
= η1,i + α1TRD + α2D(NITS) ∗ TRD + θ1Xi,t + i,t (17)
The impact of internal debt financing on capital accumulation, i.e. the
second hypothesis, is tested using a neoclassical investment equation. The
estimation equation (equation (19)) is derived by taking the natural loga-
rithm of the first order condition with respect to the capital stock derived in
the model (equation (11)) and assuming a simple production function (equa-
tion (18)). The equation states that the natural logarithm of the capital
22The omitted variable bias depends on the correlation between the omitted variable,
which is for example the tax incentive to shift to a tax haven, and the variable of interest,
which is the tax rate differential to the headquarter. Since I interact the latter with a
dummy that is one if the company has no tax incentive to shift to the headquarter, the
bias is reduced as the interaction term between the dummy and the tax rate differential
to the headquarter is less correlated with the tax rate differential to the tax haven.
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stock depends on the natural logarithm of the user costs of capital using
retained earnings less the tax advantage of the multinational firm due to
internal debt financing. To identify the impact of the tax advantage (γ), I
re-arrange equation (19). Following the argumentation for the internal debt
shifting equation, I interact the tax advantage of the multinational firm with
a dummy that is one if a firm has no tax incentive to shift profits to the
headquarter (equation (20)). I expect that the sum of the coefficient b2 and
b3 should be zero, since a multinational firm should behave as a domestic firm
if it does not engage in internal debt financing to save taxes. If, however, the
firm has a tax incentive to shift profits to the headquarter, it should have
a higher capital stock. From a theoretical point I expect further that the
coefficient for the user costs of capital (b1) is −1.
Si,t = K
σ
i,t (18)
log(Ki,t) = η2,i − b1 ∗ log[UCCG,t − γ (uG,mod,t − uA,t)
(1− uG,t) ]
+θ2log[Si,t] + wi,t (19)
log(Ki,t) = η2,i − b1 ∗ logUCCG,t + b2 (uG,mod,t − uA,t)
(1− uG,t)UCCG,t
−b3 (uG,mod,t − uA,t)
(1− uG,t)UCCG,tD(NITS) + θ2log[Si,t] + wi,t (20)
The key variable in the neoclassical investment equation (20) is the user
cost of capital (UCC ). I construct them based upon the work by both Jor-
genson (1963) as well as Hall and Jorgenson (1967). For the case without
internal debt financing, the UCCi,j,t for firm i in industry j at time t is the
weighted average of its asset a specific user costs UCCi,a,j,t:
UCCi,j,t =
∑
a
κai,tUCCi,a,j,t =
∑
a
κai,t
pIt
pSt
((1− ui,tza,t)(rt + δa,j,t)
1− ui,t (21)
where κai,t is the firm-specific share of asset a to total assets; p
I
t is a price
deflater for investment goods and pSt the industry j-specific output price at
time t23; δj,a,t is the asset a, industry j-specific economic depreciation rate
24,
23The index pIt (Investitionsgueterpreisindex ) is constructed at the country level and
the price index pSt (Erzeugerpreisindex) on a disaggregated level for manufactures by the
German Statistical Office. I use this information at the four digit industry level.
24The rate of economic depreciation δa,j,t can be derived from the national accounts
capital stock (Kapitalstockrechnung), provided by the German Statistical Office. The rate
is asset (fixed assets and structures), industry (four-digit-level) and time-specific. The
rate of economic depreciation is calculated in prices of 2000.
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and za,t are asset a-specific depreciation allowances by the tax system
25,
weighted by the tax rate ui,t. The financial costs are rt.
26 Two types of
assets are considered, property with buildings and fixed tangible assets.
I estimate the capital stock equation in first differences to account for firm-
specific effects (η2,i). Robust standard errors clustered for the location of the
parent company, are reported. Due to the short length of my panel, I am not
able to instrument the UCC to account for measurement error (Goolsbee,
2000), attenuation bias (Goolsbee, 1998; 2004), and endogeneity due to the
asset specific weighting. Since attenuation bias and measurement error bias
the coefficient downwards, the coefficient for the UCC would present a lower
bound. Since this does not hold for the bias in case of endogeneity, the
sensitivity of the results is assessed using firms’ twice lagged assets structure
for the weighting.27
Heterogeneity with respect to the use of internal debt financing is again
studied by, firstly, spitting the sample according to firm’s incentive to engage
in internal debt financing and, secondly, interacting the TRD with the share
of depreciation allowances to total assets.
In the sample for the second approach 20,993 firms are included. Around
20% of the firms are owned by foreign shareholders. Countries with the
largest number of parent companies are France, followed by Switzerland,
Sweden and the Netherlands (see Table A.1 in the Appendix). The average
firm in the sample has a fraction of internal liabilities to its shareholders of
19%, the median is 9% (see Table 6). The mean of the UCC is 13%. The
tax rate differential, which is the difference between the tax rate to which
interest expenses are deductible (incorporating the adding back regulation of
the local business tax) and the tax rate of the parent company, for all foreign
owned firms as described above has a mean of 3% and decreases over time
due to the corporate tax reform. Further, there is substantial variation in the
25In Germany, allowances for fixed assets and structures follow different methods. Struc-
tures are depreciated on a straight line basis, whereas fixed assets could also be depreciated
according to the declining-balance method until 2007. The rates of depreciation are set
by the Federal Ministry of Finance. Due to data restrictions, only regular depreciation
allowances are considered. The relevant lifetime of structures for tax purposes is 33 1/3
years. The yearly rate for the declining balance method is 0.2 for fixed assets. Because
of missing information about the relevant lifetime for different fixed assets, I assumed
a relevant lifetime of 16.9 years based on the investigation of depreciation allowances in
Germany from Oestreicher and Spengel (2002).
26I used the overall yield on corporate bonds rt provided by the German Central
Bank in its series ”Yields on debt securities outstanding issued by residents/corporate
bonds/monthly average.”
27In case the twice lagged asset structure is not observed, lagged and then the current
asset structure is used.
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics for the second sample
Obs. Mean P50 SD
All firms
Capital Stock in thd. EURO 20,993 41,963 4,468 912,975
Turnover in thd. EURO 20,993 83,418 17,130 466,342
LS/TA 20,993 0.19 0.09 0.23
Business tax rate 20,993 0.35 0.37 0.05
UCC 20,993 0.13 0.12 0.05
d.log(Capital stock) 15,113 0.03 -0.01 0.68
d.log(Turnover) 15,113 -0.00 0.03 1.13
d.LS/TA 15,113 -0.00 -0.00 0.11
D.Business tax rate 15,113 -0.02 0.00 0.03
d.log(UCC) 15,113 -0.02 0.01 0.15
Only foreign owned firms
Dummy(No incentive to shift, NITS) 4,719 0.31 0.00 0.46
TRD 4,719 0.03 0.03 0.07
TRD/(1-Business tax rate, BTR) 4,719 0.05 0.04 0.11
d.Dummy(NITS) 3,322 0.09 0.00 0.35
d.TRD 3,322 -0.01 0.00 0.04
d.(TRD/(1-BTR)) 3,322 -0.02 0.00 0.06
Source: DAFNE firm data base 2004 - 2010.
tax rate differential. Almost 31% of the foreign owned firms do not have a
tax incentive to shift profits to the headquarter. For around 9% of the foreign
owned firms, the incentive to shift profits vanished with the reform. The tax
advantage of the multinational, given by TRD/(1-Business tax rate), equals
2% or roughly 15% of the UCC.
6.2 Results
The results for the change in the ratio of liabilities against shareholders to to-
tal assets as dependent variable are reported in Table 7. Column (1) presents
the baseline specification with the tax rate differential (TRD) and the in-
teraction term. The results show that the TRD has a significant, positive
impact on the ratio of liabilities to shareholders to total assets, if it is posi-
tive. Otherwise no impact is found (bottom line of the table, standard errors
are calculated using the delta method). This is in line with the hypothesis
1a derived from the model. It adds further evidence to the prior literature
on internal debt shifting as a switch in the two regimes (from shifting to
non-shifting) is used for the identification. The results also hold if the two
tax rates enter separately (column (2)) or, if the TRD is defined as zero if it
would be negative (column (3)).
The size of the coefficients, which are statistically not different between
the specifications, suggests that an increase in the TRD by 10%-points in-
creases the share of liabilities against shareholders by 2.9%-points. Com-
pared to the prior literature that found an increase of around 1%-points (e.g.
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Huizinga et al., 2008; Buettner and Wamser, 2013), the result seems quite
large. However, at least three reasons may explain the difference. The first
relates to the dependent variable and the used tax differential. In most of
the papers on internal debt shifting, the dependent variable is the overall in-
ternal debt ratio, which includes all liabilities to other group members (e.g.
Buettner and Wamser, 2013), or even the overall debt ratio (e.g. Huizinga
et al., 2008). The used tax differential is a (asset-) weighted tax differential.
In case the weighting is not appropriate, a measurement error occurs, which
biases the estimated coefficient to zero. This study, in contrast, focuses solely
on liabilities to the parent company and thus no weighting is necessary to
derive the correct tax rate differential. Secondly, I explicitly account for
the direction of shifting by including the interaction term with the tax rate
differential and the dummy that is one if the firm has no incentive to shift
profits abroad. Other papers focus solely on liabilities of companies with-
out accounting whether firms shift in or outwards. To assess whether this
argument explains part of the difference, I estimate a specification without
controlling for the interaction with the No-Incentive-to-Shift dummy. The
result is shown in column (4). The estimated coefficient for the tax rate
differential decreases by 0.1 and is now much closer to prior studies. Fi-
nally, adjustment costs may play a role as well. Since I focus on a particular
strong tax rate reduction, these are likely to be of minor importance for my
estimate.
The results for the heterogeneity analysis show that firms within an in-
dustry with a low ratio of profits before interest to the capital stock react to
tax incentives with their internal debt financing four times as strong than on
average (Table 8, column (1)). In contrast, firms that are not likely to engage
in internal debt financing due to fixed costs, seem not to react. Further, the
results suggest - in line with the hypothesis - that more generous depreciation
allowances reduce the tax sensitivity remarkable. The estimated sensitivity
of internal debt for firms with no depreciation allowances amounts to 2.3
and is thus more than seven times higher than the one found in the baseline
regression.
To assess whether the change in the internal liabilities shows up in interest
payments as well, I use the net interest result scaled by total assets as depen-
dent variables (Table A.4 in the Appendix, column (1) and (4)). The results
suggest that an increase of 10%-points in the tax rate differential, decrease
the net interest results to total assets for firms that are likely to engage in
debt financing by around 0.0086. This estimate suggests an interest rate of
6% on liabilities to the parent company, which seems quite plausible.28 For
28A 10%-points increase in the TRD increases the share of internal liabilities by 15%-
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Table 7: Results debt ratio
Dep. Var. Change in liabilities against shareholders
(1) (2) (3) (4)
d.Business tax rate [=uG,t] -0.331 -0.047 -0.333 -0.350
(0.231) (0.254) (0.232) (0.227)
d.TRD [= umod,G,t − uA,t] (1) 0.288*** 0.185**
(0.092) (0.072)
d.(TRD*D(NITS))(2) -0.311**
(0.148)
d.umod,G,t*D(NITS) -0.275
(0.172)
d.uA,t (1) -0.316***
(0.112)
d.(uA,t*D(NITS))(2) 0.286*
(0.155)
d.(TRD if > 0, 0 else) 0.285***
(0.088)
d.Firmsize 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 15,113 15,113 15,113 15,113
Coefficient (1) + (2) -0.023 -0.031
SE (Delta method) 0.079 0.140
Note: Robust standard errors clustered for the location of the parent in paren-
theses. Each regression includes a full set of time dummies (not reported).
Stars *, **, *** indicate significant at the 10/5/1% level.
Source: DAFNE firm database, 2004 to 2010, own calculations.
Table 8: Results heterogeneity debt ratio
Dep. Var. Change in liabilities against shareholders
Sample
pF (.)
K
< Mean
pF (.)
K
> Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4)
d.Business tax rate [=uG,t] 0.231* 0.224** -0.600* -0.601*
(0.112) (0.100) (0.356) (0.355)
d.(TRD if > 0, 0 else) 1.467*** 2.287** 0.112 0.118
(0.506) (0.830) (0.093) (0.110)
d.(TRD if > 0, 0 else)*Depr.A
K
-14.710* -0.115
(8.218) (0.707)
d.Firmsize 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.045*** 0.045***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011)
Observations 6,915 6,915 8,198 8,198
Note: Robust standard errors clustered for the location of the parent in paren-
theses. Each regression includes a full set of time dummies (not reported).
Stars *, **, *** indicate significant at the 10/5/1% level.
Source: DAFNE firm database, 2004 to 2010, own calculations.
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the other firms the sign is positive, which suggests that firms likely to engage
in transfer pricing use less internal debt financing.
To assess whether firms unlikely to engage in internal debt financing use
transfer pricing to reduce their tax payments, I estimate the same specifi-
cation using before interest profits to total assets as the dependent variable
(Table A.4 in the Appendix, column (2) and (5)). The coefficient for the
TRD is only significant in the sample of firms that are unlikely to engage in
internal debt financing. To rule out that measurement error drives the re-
sults, I constructed a modified TRD that captures the incentive to engage in
transfer pricing, and re-run the regressions. The modified TRD differs from
the TRD used so far, as the latter accounts for the adding back regulation of
the local business tax. The precision of the estimates increases (decreases)
for firms unlikely (likely) to engage in internal debt financing (column (3)
and (6)). This suggest that firms that are not likely to engage in internal
debt financing do use transfer pricing.
The results of the capital stock equation (Table 9) show that the elasticity
of the capital stock with respect to its user costs is not statistically different
from −1, which is line with my model and the prior literature (e.g. Dwenger,
2014). The coefficient for sales is, however, as in other studies quite small and
suggests decreasing returns to scale. An impact of the tax advantage of the
multinational firm on investment spending is only found for firms engaging
in tax-motivated internal debt shifting. If firms have no tax incentive to shift
profits to the headquarter, the TRD does not affect their investment decision
(bottom line of the table, coefficient is statistically not different from zero).
This holds again when including the two tax rate separately as well as a
modified TRD, which is zero if the TRD is negative.
Regarding firm heterogeneity, the results suggest that capital accumula-
tion of firms with a low ratio of profits before interest to their capital stock
depends much more strongly on the TRD (Table 10, column (1) and (3)).
The reason is that only these firms are able to use internal debt financing
to re-allocate a large share of their profits, which reduces the tax burden
on capital and thus fosters investment. The advantage is, however, decreas-
ing in the generosity of the depreciation allowances as they reduce the tax
burden on capital as well (column (2) and (4)). In contrast is the impact
on profit shifting activities on investment for firms that engage in transfer
pricing. For these firms profit shifting activities do only to a small extent
affect investment. This suggests in line with the results of the first approach
that transfer pricing and internal debt financing affect capital accumulation
points (Table 8, column (1)). This translates for a interest rate of 6% to a change in firms’
interest results to total assets of 0.009.
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Table 9: Results capital stock
Dep. Var. Growth rate of the capital stock
B = (1 −BTR) ∗ UCC
(1) (2) (3)
d.log(UCC) -1.259*** -1.139*** -1.260***
(0.138) (0.074) (0.138)
d. TRD
B
(1) 0.136**
(0.052)
d.(TRD
B
*D(NITS)) (1) -0.151*
(0.085)
d.
uG,mod,t
B
0.163**
(0.075)
d.(
uG,mod,t
B
*D(NITS)) -0.156
(0.136)
d.
uA,t
B
-0.135**
(0.065)
d.(
uA,t
B
*D(NITS)) 0.154
(0.114)
d.(TRD
B
if > 0, 0 else) 0.134**
(0.051)
d.log(Sales) 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.044***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Observations 15,113 15,113 15,113
Coefficient (1) + (2) -0.016 0.020
SE (Delta method) 0.052 0.134
Note: Robust standard errors clustered for the location of the
parent in parentheses. Each regression includes a full set of time
dummies (not reported). Stars *, **, *** indicate significant at
the 10/5/1% level.
Source: DAFNE firm database, 2004 to 2010, own calculations.
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in different ways.
Table 10: Results heterogeneity capital stock
Dep. Var. Growth rate of the capital stock
B = (1 −BTR) ∗ UCC
Sample
pF (.)
K
< Mean
pF (.)
K
> Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4)
d.log(UCC) -1.071*** -1.059*** -1.571*** -1.578***
(0.123) (0.110) (0.147) (0.148)
d.(TRD
B
if > 0, 0 else) 0.459** 0.923*** 0.098** -0.064
(0.206) (0.267) (0.044) (0.118)
d.(TRD
B
if > 0, 0 else)*Depr.A
K
-9.119*** 3.294
(2.449) (2.327)
d.log(Sales) 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.036** 0.035**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
Observations 6,915 6,915 8,198 8,198
Note: Robust standard errors clustered for the location of the parent in parentheses.
Each regression includes a full set of time dummies (not reported). Stars *, **, ***
indicate significant at the 10/5/1% level.
Source: DAFNE firm database, 2004 to 2010, own calculations.
Sensitivity Analysis
To check the sensitivity of the results, I perform four robustness checks.
The first relates to the fact that German owned firms might be differently
affected by the business cycle. Thus, I exclude all domestic owned firms from
the sample and re-estimate the equation of the heterogeneity analysis. The
results for the debt ratio are shown in Table A.5, column (1) and (4), and
for the capital stock in Table A.6, column (1) and (4). They are statistically
not different from the results for the sample shown above.
The second sensitivity check accounts for the redesigned thin capitaliza-
tion rule in Germany (see Buslei and Simmler, 2013). The regulation, which
was introduced in 2008, restricts the amount of deductible interest expenses
to 30% of the tax adjusted EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depre-
ciation and amortization). Since the German government, however, was not
interested in harming its own economy, the regulation came with several es-
capes clauses. The most important one is the exemption limit of 1 million
euro. If firms have net interest expenses below the exemption threshold, the
regulation is not applied. The exemption limit was raised retroactively in
2009 to 3 million euro due to the impact of the financial crisis. To check
the sensitivity of my results, I re-estimate the last specifications using only
firms with net interest expenses below 1 million euro. The results for the
debt shifting equation are reported in column (2) and (5) of Table A.5 and
for the investment equation in column (2) and (5) of Table A.6. Again the
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results are not statistically different from the ones using the whole sample,
which is due to the fact that only few firms are affected by the regulation.
In the third sensitivity check the internal debt shifting equation is es-
timated using the overall internal debt ratio as dependent variable. It is
defined as the sum of liabilities to the parent company and to all other group
members. The main idea is to assess whether the changed incentive to engage
in internal debt financing to the headquarter causes an increase in liabilities
to other group members. If this is the case, the estimated coefficient for the
TRD should shrink sharply. The results suggest, however, that no substitu-
tion took place (Table A.5, column (3) and (6)).
Finally, the fourth sensitivity test relates to the potential endogeneity of
the UCC. To address whether this biases the estimates for the tax advantage
of the multinational firm in the capital stock equation, I use the twice-lagged
assets structure for weighting the asset-specific UCC. The results are shown
in Table A.6 in the Appendix. Although the estimated coefficient decreases
for the UCC, the ones for the tax advantage as well as for the impact of the
depreciation allowance remain basically unchanged.
7 Comparing the two Methods
To compare the results of the two different methods, I calculated the ex-
pected change in firms’ debt ratio and capital stock for the first sample using
the structural parameter estimates of the second method. More precisely, I
predict firms’ behavioral response with respect to the two variables using the
change in the TRD and TRD/(1-BTR)UCC for Shifter-NonShifter for the
first sample from 2007 to 2008. Table 11 summarizes the estimated impact
for the two methods.
The comparison shows that the ratio between the change in the (internal)
debt ratio and in the capital stock are almost identical for the two methods
(around 21%). The absolute impact differs however. The impact estimated
in the structural approach is only half the size of the estimated impact on
the DiD approach. Two reasons may explain the difference and both are
related to the used tax rate differential, which is the Achilles’ heel of the
second approach. The first explanation questions whether the adding back
regulation for the local business tax before the reform were binding. Accord-
ing to the regulation, 50% of the interest payments on long term debt had
to be added back. Since multinational firms could avoid the regulation by
using only short term loans, the used tax rate differential would not been
the correct one. To investigate whether this changes the picture, the impact
on debt ratio and capital stock is calculated using the modified TRD. The
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Table 11: Comparison of the results DiD and structural approach
DiD Structural Approach
Estimated Estimated TRD resp. Estimated
Coefficient Coefficient TRD
(1−BTR)UCC Impact
Baseline estimation results
Change in the debt ratio -0.022*** 0.285*** -0.043 -0.012***
(0.005) (0.088) (0.004)
Change log(capital stock) -0.107** 0.134** -0.443 -0.059**
(0.040) (0.051) (0.022)
d.Debt
d.log(capitalstock)
in % 21 21
A1: TRD if adding back regulation local business tax before the reform was not binding
[A2: 30% shift to the headquarter and 70% to other subsidiaries]
Change in the debt ratio 0.022*** 0.285*** -0.073 [-0.075] -0.021*** [-0.022***]
(0.005) (0.088) (0.006) [(0.007)]
Change log(capital stock) -0.107** 0.134** -0.744 [-0.0769] -0.099** [-0.103**]
(0.040) (0.051) (0.038) [(0.039)]
Firm likely to engage in debt shifting with no depreciation allowances
Change in the debt ratio -0.068 2.287*** -0.043 -0.095***
(0.063) (0.830) (0.035)
Change log(capital stock) -0.776** 0.923*** -0.443 -0.435***
(0.235) (0.267) (0.118)
d.Debt
d.log(capitalstock)
in % 9 22
A1: TRD if adding back regulation local business tax before the reform was not binding
[A2: 30% shift to the headquarter and 70% to other subsidiaries]
Change in the debt ratio -0.068 2.287*** -0.073 [-0.075] -0.161*** [-0.168***]
(0.063) (0.830) (0.061) [(0.062)]
Change log(capital stock) -0.776** 0.923*** -0.744 [-0.769] -0.733*** [-0.782***]
(0.235) (0.267) (0.199) [(0.205)]
Notes: The TRD in alternative 1 is calculated as a weighted average. The TRD amounts for the
case of shifting to other subsidiaries to 9%. The TRD for alternative 2 is before (after) the reform
calculated as the difference between the tax rate on profits (tax rate to which interest expenses
are deductible) in Germany and the tax rate on profits abroad before. The TRD/(1-BTR)UCC
are adjusted to the changed TRD.
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results of the two approaches are now very similar.
Another explanation for the difference between the two approaches could
be that part of the subsidiaries do not shift profits to the headquarters but
to other subsidiaries in low tax countries. If I assume that only 30% of all
multinational firms shift to the headquarters, whereas the rest shift to tax
havens, and use a weighted average of the TRD (similar to equation (16)),
the results are again very similar. Most likely both explanation are able to
explain part of the difference.
Comparing the estimated impact for firms likely to engage in internal
debt shifting with no depreciation allowances leads to similar conclusions.
Firstly, the ratio of the change in debt financing to the change in capital
stock is in the structural approach again around 21%. The ratio for the DiD
approach is lower but the coefficient for the debt ratio has not been estimated
very precisely. Secondly, the estimated, absolute impact using the structural
approach is again much lower. However, as before, both explanations, that
the adding back regulations were not binding before the tax rate reduction,
and that some firms shift to other subsidiaries, lead to a very similar impact
for the change in the capital stock for the structural and the DiD approach.
8 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to provide evidence on the causal impact of profit
shifting activities of multinational firms on their capital accumulation. This
is important as profit shifting activities have, so far, been seen as welfare
decreasing for countries. If these activities, however, foster capital accu-
mulation, they might at least to some extend be beneficial by reducing the
negative impact of taxation on capital accumulation (e.g. Hong and Smart,
2010).
This paper contributes to the existing literature in at least three ways.
Firstly, I employ a new identification strategy to uncover the impact of profit
shifting activities of multinational companies on their capital accumulation.
Secondly, the study attempts to disentangle the potential different impact
of different means of profit shifting by focusing on internal debt financing.
Finally, two different identification strategies are employed that provide con-
sistent results.
The findings suggest that in particular internal debt financing fosters cap-
ital accumulation by decreasing the tax burden on capital, but not transfer
pricing. Thus, the tax rate reduction in Germany had only a modest impact
on multinational firms’ investment spending if these firms used before the
reform internal debt financing to shift profits out of Germany. Moreover, the
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results show that generous depreciation allowances reduce the tax sensitivity
of internal borrowing remarkably. Since depreciation allowances decrease the
tax burden on capital as well, they also lower the tax advantage of firms
engaging in internal debt shifting with respect to the capital stock.
Altogether the results suggest that internal debt shifting activities of
multinational firms are to some extend welfare increasing. The results, how-
ever, also speak for tax cuts to increase the competitiveness of domestic firms.
These firms face a competitive disadvantage as they are not able to engage
in internal debt financing, at least not as long as they remain domestic. Fur-
ther, the findings highlight the role of recent tax reforms that followed the
principle tax rate cut cum base broadening. The reduction in the tax rate
might have decreased the number of firms shifting profits abroad, but the
reduction in the generosity of depreciation allowances increased the tax ad-
vantage of firms still shifting profits via internal debt financing. Given these
benefits, it is likely that more firms will become multinational (Bucovetsky
and Haufler, 2008).
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Appendix - Additional Descriptive Statistics
and Regression Results
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics on the location of the (ultimate) parent
company
All firms Sample 1 Sample 2
Australia 340 120 53
Austria 1464 140 224
Belgium 878 440 127
Canada 376 75 47
Cayman Islands 125 0 19
Czech Republic 29 0 11
Denmark 1951 190 242
Finland 596 105 138
France 4,919 2,260 1,175
Germany 78,918 30,415 16,274
Hong Kong 67 0 14
Iceland 27 0 10
India 256 110 27
Ireland 374 0 56
Israel 160 30 12
Italy 1816 0 314
Korea, Republic of 256 85 114
Kuwait 83 0 24
Luxembourg 644 150 82
Malaysia 29 5 24
Mexico 85 35 14
Netherlands 2315 210 413
Norway 423 175 87
Other countries 705 40 80
South Africa 95 0 14
Spain 642 250 140
Sweden 2040 760 416
Switzerland 3753 0 800
Taiwan 189 25 42
Total 103,555 35,620 20,993
Notes: Sample 1 includes German owned firms that do not own foreign
subsidiaries and foreign owned firms that had before the reform an
incentive to shift profits via internal debt financing to the headquarter,
which was abolished due to the reform. All firms in sample 1 are
required to be observed in every year between 2005 and 2009. Sample
2 includes all firms for which liabilities against the parent company
are observed.
Source: DAFNE firm database, own calculations.
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Table A.2: Logistic regression of the propensity score
Matching variables all without
(1), (2), (3)
Log(Total Assets 2006) 0.246*** 0.240***
(0.019) (0.019)
Debt Ratio 2006 (1) 0.289**
(0.127)
Log(Capital Stock 2006) -0.125*** -0.116***
(0.013) (0.013)
d.Debt Ratio 2006 (2) 1.052***
(0.313)
d.log(capital stock 2006) (3) -0.125***
(0.047)
Industry dummies
agriculture -3.636*** -3.774***
(1.012) (1.011)
electricity and gas supply -2.690*** -2.898***
(0.196) (0.194)
water supply -0.918*** -0.966***
(0.219) (0.218)
construction 0.117 0.225*
(0.125) (0.124)
wholesale and retail trade -3.740*** -3.741***
(1.012) (1.011)
transportation and storage -1.446*** -1.568***
(0.155) (0.154)
information and communication -1.555*** -1.259***
(0.288) (0.281)
accommodation -1.934*** -1.759***
(0.105) (0.101)
real estate activities -5.332*** -5.371***
(1.005) (1.005)
professional, technical activities -4.142*** -4.334***
(0.420) (0.419)
support service activities -2.663*** -2.719***
(0.200) (0.200)
Observations 7,124 7,124
Notes: The dependent variable is the treatment indicator. It equals
one for firms that had before the corporate tax reform an incentive
to shift profits via internal debt financing to the headquarter, but
not after the reform. It is zero for purely domestic firms. Stars
*,**,*** indicate significance at the 1/5/10% level.
Source: DAFNE firm database, 2005, 2006, own calculations.
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Table A.3: Standardized bias before and after matching
Mean Standardized Bias in %
Treatment Control Before After matching
Matching method Kernel NN Kernel
Matching variables all without
(1), (2),
(3)
firm size (log(total assets) 2005 8.81 8.26 22.89 2.24 0.25 1.39
debt ratio 2005 (1) 0.5 0.45 14.28 -0.08 0.29 6.64
log(capital stock) 2005 5.54 6.12 -16.41 3.10 5.70 2.94
d.debt ratio 2006 (2) 0.00 -0.01 5.5 -0.26 -0.54 10.81
d.log(capital stock) (3) 2006 0.00 0.04 -5.21 1.07 -0.26 -8.38
Industry dummies
agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.00 0.01 -12.93 -1.31 0.65 -0.92
manufacturing 0.25 0.05 57.57 2.99 0.25 2.63
electricity and gas supply 0.03 0.10 -28.99 -1.04 0.03 -1.05
water supply 0.03 0.01 7.62 2.5 0.03 3.41
construction 0.22 0.04 54.98 1.76 0.22 2.21
wholesale and retail trade 0.00 0.01 -13.3 -1.41 0.00 -1.01
transportation and storage 0.06 0.06 -0.56 0.16 0.06 0.61
information and communication 0.01 0.01 2.22 -0.25 0.01 -0.20
accommodation 0.33 0.41 -18.00 -2.13 0.33 -3.27
real estate activities 0.00 0.05 -31.89 -6.45 0.00 -5.8
professional, technical activities 0.00 0.08 -40.12 -4.88 0.00 -3.76
support service activities 0.03 0.10 -31.34 -1.34 0.03 -1.14
Notes: Control group consists of purely domestic firms, that are observed between 2005 and
2009. Treatment group includes firms that had before the reform an incentive to engage in debt
financing, which was abolished due to the reform.
Source: DAFNE firm database, 2005,2006, own calculations.
Table A.4: Results interest result and profits
Dep. Var. Interest Profit before Interest Profit before
(scaled by total assets) Result Interest Result Interest
Sample
pF (.)
K
< Mean
pF (.)
K
> Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
d.Business tax rate [=uG,t] -0.076*** -0.598** -0.600** -0.076 0.307 0.353
(0.009) (0.235) (0.235) (0.050) (0.269) (0.287)
d.TRD [= umod,G,t − uA,t] (1) -0.087** -0.281 0.012** -0.179**
(0.033) (0.164) (0.005) (0.082)
d.(TRD*D(NITS))(2) 0.106** 0.363* -0.015 -0.095
(0.044) (0.203) (0.009) (0.157)
d.TRD (modified) (1) -0.224 -0.187**
(0.206) (0.081)
d.TRD (modified)*D(NITS) 0.333 -0.196
(0.443) (0.262)
Observations 5,680 5,680 5,680 6,707 6,707 6,707
Coeff. (1)+(2) 0.020 0.082 0.109 -0.003 -0.274 -0.384
SE (Delta method) 0.015 0.087 0.259 0.008 0.144 0.246
Note: Robust standard errors clustered for the location of the parent in parentheses. Each regression
includes a full set of time dummies (not reported). Stars *, **, *** indicate significant at the 10/5/1%
level.
Source: DAFNE firm database, 2004 to 2010, own calculations.
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Table A.5: Sensitivity analysis debt ratio
Dep. Var. Change in liabilities against shareholders (LS) resp. group members (LGM)
Sample
pF (.)
K
< Mean
pF (.)
K
> Mean
Dep. Var. LS LGM LS LGM
German owned firms excluded x x
Firms with interest result x x
> 1 million EURO
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
d.Business tax rate [=uG,t] 0.282 0.194* 0.247** -0.365 -0.617* -0.346
(2.360) (0.106) (0.117) (0.866) (0.366) (0.456)
d.(TRD if > 0, 0 else) 2.544*** 2.299** 2.126*** 0.099 0.119 0.120***
(0.896) (0.824) (0.666) (0.162) (0.111) (0.042)
d.(TRD if > 0, 0 else)*Depr.A
K
-14.849* -14.797* -16.836** -0.013 -0.205 -0.720**
(8.487) (8.161) (7.773) (0.731) (0.671) (0.325)
d.Firmsize 0.041** 0.026*** 0.034*** 0.028 0.045*** 0.070***
(0.017) (0.005) (0.005) (0.018) (0.011) (0.010)
Observations 429 6,802 6,913 2,893 8,013 8,194
Note: Robust standard errors clustered for the location of the parent in parentheses. Each regression includes
a full set of time dummies (not reported). Stars *, **, *** indicate significant at the 10/5/1% level.
Source: DAFNE firm database, 2004 to 2010, own calculations.
Table A.6: Sensitivity analysis capital stock
Dep. Var. Growth rate of the capital stock
B = (1 −BTR) ∗ UCC and Bmod = (1 −BTR) ∗ UCCmod
Sample
pF (.)
K
< Mean
pF (.)
K
> Mean
German owned firms excluded x x
Firms with interest result x x
> 1 million EURO
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
d.log(UCC) -2.196** -1.088*** -1.730*** -1.592***
(0.818) (0.110) (0.478) (0.148)
d.log(UCCmod) -0.252*** -0.317***
(0.044) (0.080)
d.(TRD
B
if > 0, 0 else) 0.806*** 0.920*** -0.007 -0.069
(0.285) (0.264) (0.147) (0.119)
d.(TRD
B
if > 0, 0 else)*Depr.A
K
-6.494*** -9.029*** 3.183 3.386
(1.418) (2.392) (2.261) (2.358)
d.( TRD
Bmod
if > 0, 0 else) 0.860** -0.054
(0.335) (0.104)
d.( TRD
Bmod
if > 0, 0 else)*Depr.A
K
-8.923** 2.649
(3.390) (2.035)
d.log(Sales) 0.167** 0.055*** 0.061*** 0.074*** 0.035** 0.041***
(0.069) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.014) (0.013)
Observations 429 6,802 6,915 2,893 8,013 8,198
Note: Robust standard errors clustered for the location of the parent in parentheses. Each regression includes
a full set of time dummies (not reported). Stars *, **, *** indicate significant at the 10/5/1% level.
Source: DAFNE firm database, 2004 to 2010, own calculations.
42
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation 
Working Paper series recent papers 
 
WP 15/29 Daniel Shaviro The crossroads versus the seesaw: getting a 'fix' on recent 
international tax policy developments 
 
WP 15/28  Zhonglan Dai, Douglas A Shackelford, Yue (Layla) Ying and Harold H Zhang Do 
companies invest more after shareholder tax cuts? 
 
WP 15/27  Martin Ruf and Julia Schmider Who bears the cost of taxing the rich? An 
empirical study on CEO pay 
 
WP 15/26  Eric Orhn The corporate investment response to the domestic production 
activities deduction 
 
WP 15/25  Li Liu International taxation and MNE investment: evidence from the UK change 
to territoriality 
 
WP 15/24  Edward D Kleinbard Reimagining capital income taxation 
 
WP 15/23 James R Hines Jr, Niklas Potrafke, Marina Riem and Christoph Schinke Inter 
vivos transfers of ownership in family firms 
 
WP 15/22 Céline Azémar and Dhammika Dharmapala Tax sparing agreements, territorial 
tax reforms, and foreign direct investment 
 
WP 15/21 Wei Cui A critical review of proposals for destination-based cash-flow 
corporate taxation as an international tax reform option 
 
WP 15/20 Andrew Bird and Stephen A Karolyi Governance and taxes: evidence from 
regression discontinuity 
 
WP 15/19 Reuven Avi-Yonah Reinventing the wheel: what we can learn from the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 
 
WP 15/18 Annette Alstadsæter, Salvador Barrios, Gaetan Nicodeme, Agnieszka Maria 
Skonieczna and Antonio Vezzani Patent boxes design, patents,location and local R&D 
 
WP 15/17 Laurent Bach Do better entrepreneurs avoid more taxes? 
 
WP 15/16 Nadja Dwenger, Frank M Fossen and Martin Simmler From financial to real 
economic crisis: evidence from individual firm–bank relationships in Germany 
 
WP 15/15 Giorgia Maffini and John Vella Evidence-based policy-making? The 
Commission's proposal for an FTT 
 
WP 15/14 Clemens Fuest and Jing Xing How can a country 'graduate' from procyclical 
fiscal policy? Evidence from China? 
 
WP 15/13 Richard Collier and Giorgia Maffini The UK international tax agenda for business 
and the impact of the OECD BEPS project 
 
WP 15/11 Irem Guceri Tax incentives and R&D: an evaluation of the 2002 UK reform using 
micro data 
 
WP 15/10 Rita de la Feria and Parintira Tanawong Surcharges and penalties in UK tax law 
 
WP 15/09 Ernesto Crivelli, Ruud de Mooij,  Michael Keen Base erosion, profit-shifting and 
developing countries  
 
WP 15/08 Judith Freedman Managing tax complexity: the institutional framework for tax 
policy-making and oversight  
 
WP 15/07 Michael P Devereux, Giorgia Maffini and Jing Xing Corporate tax incentives and 
capital structure: empirical evidence from UK tax returns  
 
WP 15/06 Li Liu and Ben Lockwood VAT notches 
 
WP 15/05 Clemens Fuest and Li Liu Does ownership affect the impact of taxes on firm 
behaviour? Evidence from China. 
 
WP 15/04 Michael P Devereux, Clemens Fuest and Ben Lockwood The taxation of foreign 
profits: a unified view 
 
WP 15/03 Jitao Tang and Rosanne Altshuler The spillover effects of outward foreign direct 
investment on home countries: evidence from the United States 
 
WP 15/02 Juan Carlos Suarez Serrato and Owen Zidar Who benefits from state corporate 
tax cuts? A local labour markets approach with heterogeneous firms 
 
WP 15/01 Ronald B Davies, Julien Martin, Mathieu Parenti and Farid Toubal Knocking on 
Tax Haven’s Door: multinational firms and transfer pricing 
 
WP 14/27 Peter Birch Sørensen Taxation and the optimal constraint on corporate debt 
finance 
 
WP 14/26 Johannes Becker, Ronald B Davies and Gitte Jakobs The economics of advance 
pricing agreements 
 
WP 14/25 Michael P Devereux and John Vella Are we heading towards a corporate tax 
system fit for the 21st century? 
 
WP 14/24 Martin Simmler Do multinational firms invest more? On the impact of internal 
debt financing on capital accumulation 
 
WP 14/23  Ben Lockwood and Erez Yerushalmi Should transactions services be taxed at 
the same rate as consumption? 
 
WP 14/22 Chris Sanchirico As American as Apple Inc: International tax and ownership 
nationality 
 
WP 14/19  Jörg Paetzold and Hannes Winner Taking the High Road? Compliance with 
commuter tax allowances and the role of evasion spillovers 
 
WP 14/18 David Gamage How should governments promote distributive justice?: A 
framework for analyzing the optimal choice of tax instruments 
 
WP 14/16 Scott D Dyreng, Jeffrey L Hoopes and Jaron H Wilde Public pressure and 
corporate tax behaviour 
 
WP 14/15 Eric Zwick and James Mahon Do financial frictions amplify fiscal policy? 
Evidence from business investment stimulus 
 
WP 14/14 David Weisbach The use of neutralities in international tax policy 
 
WP 14/13 Rita de la Feria Blueprint for reform of VAT rates in Europe 
 
WP 14/12 Miguel Almunia and David Lopez Rodriguez Heterogeneous responses to 
effective tax enforcement: evidence from Spanish firms 
 
WP 14/11 Charles E McLure, Jack Mintz and George R Zodrow US Supreme Court 
unanimously chooses substance over form in foreign tax credit 
 
WP 14/10 David Neumark and Helen Simpson Place-based policies 
 
WP 14/09 Johannes Becker and Ronald B Davies A negotiation-based model of tax-
induced transfer pricing 
 
WP 14/08 Marko Koethenbuerger and Michael Stimmelmayr  Taxing multinationals in the 
presence of internal capital markets 
 
WP 14/07 Michael Devereux and Rita de la Feria Designing and implementing a 
destination-based corporate tax 
 
WP 14/05 John W Diamond and George R Zodrow The dynamic economic effects of a US 
corporate income tax rate reduction 
 
WP 14/04 Claudia Keser, Gerrit Kimpel and Andreas Oesterricher The CCCTB option – an 
experimental study 
 
WP 14/03 Arjan Lejour The foreign investment effects of tax treaties 
 
WP 14/02 Ralph-C. Bayer Harald Oberhofer and Hannes Winner The occurrence of tax 
amnesties: theory and evidence 
 
WP14/01 Nils Herger, Steve McCorriston and Christos Kotsogiannisz Multiple taxes and 
alternative forms of FDI: evidence from cross-border acquisitions 
 
WP13/25  Michael Devereux, Niels Johannesen and John Vella Can taxes tame the banks? 
Evidence from European bank levies 
WP13/24  Matt Krzepkowski Debt and  tax losses: the effect of tax asymmetries on the 
cost of capital and capital structure 
WP13/23  Jennifer Blouin, Harry Huizinga, Luc Laeven, Gaëtan Nicodème Thin 
capitalization rules and multinational firm capital structure 
WP13/22  Danny Yagan Capital tax reform and the real economy: the effects of the 2003 
dividend tax cut 
WP13/21  Andreas Haufler and Christoph Lülfesmann  Reforming an asymmetric union: on 
the virtues of dual tier capital taxation 
WP13/20  Michael Blackwell Do the haves come out ahead in tax litigation? An empirical 
study of the dynamics of tax appeals in the UK 
WP13/19  Johannes Becker and Ronald B Davies Learning and international policy diffusion: 
the case of corporate tax policy 
WP13/18  Reuven S Avi-Yonah And yet it moves: taxation and labour mobility in the 21st 
century 
WP13/17 Anne Brockmeyer The investment effect of taxation: evidence from a corporate 
tax kink 
WP13/16 Dominika Langenmayr and Rebecca Lesterz Taxation and corporate risk-taking  
WP13/15 Martin Ruf and Alfons J Weichenrieder CFC legislation, passive assets and the 
impact of the ECJ’s Cadbury-Schweppes decision 
WP13/14 Annette Alstadsæter and Martin Jacob The effect of awareness and incentives 
on tax evasion 
WP13/13 Jarkko Harju and Tuomos Matikka The elasticity of taxable income and income-
shifting between tax bases: what is “real” and what is not? 
WP13/12 Li Liu and Andrew Harper Temporary increase in annual investment allowance 
WP13/11 Alan J Auderbach and Michael P Devererux Consumption and cash-flow taxes in 
an international setting 
WP13/10 Andreas Haufler and Mohammed Mardan Cross-border loss offset can fuel tax 
competition 
WP13/09 Ben Lockwood How should financial intermediation services be taxed? 
WP13/08 Dominika Langenmayr, Andreas Haufler and Christian J bauer Should tax policy 
favour high or low productivity firms? 
WP13/07 Theresa Lohse and Nadine Riedel Do transfer pricing laws limit international 
income shifting? Evidence from European multinationals 
WP13/06 Ruud de Mooij and Jost Heckemeyer Taxation and corporate debt: are banks any 
different? 
WP13/05 Rita de la Feria EU VAT rate structure: towards unilateral convergence? 
WP13/04 Johannes Becker and Melaine Steinhoff Conservative accounting yields excessive 
risk-taking - a note 
WP13/03 Michael P.Devereux, Clemens Fuest, and Ben Lockwood The Taxation of Foreign 
Profits: a Unified View 
WP13/02 Giorgia Maffini  Corporate tax policy under the Labour government 1997-2010 
WP13/01 Christoph Ernst, Katharina Richter and Nadine Riedel  Corporate taxation and the 
quality of research & development 
 
